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ESCAPING ANTITRUST IMMUNITY-
DECERTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL
BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1963, Herman Levy and Erwin Krasnow wrote a law
review article titled Unionization and Professional Sports.'
In this article the authors argued that because of the inher-
ent weakness of the professional athlete's bargaining position
vis-A-vis the strength of management, professional athletes
in all team sports should follow the developing lead of major
league baseball ("MLB") and the National Football League
("NFL") and unionize in order to gain greater strength at the
bargaining table.2 In the ensuing decades, athletes in all ma-
jor professional sports (football, basketball, baseball, and
hockey) did in fact unionize, and salary increases for athletes
over the past four decades have enormously outpaced those of
society at large,3 to the point where the average salary of pro-
fessional athletes is arguably the highest of any profession.4
Undoubtedly this escalation of salaries has been the result of
a combination of factors. The main factors are the bur-
geoning popularity of professional sports and the power of tel-
evision in combination with the increased bargaining power
1. Erwin G. Krasnow & Herman M. Levy, Unionization and Professional
Sports, 51 GEO L.J. 749 (1963).
2. Id.
3. In 1983, the average National Basketball Association ("NBA") player
salary was $240,000. Michael Goodwin, Antitrust Trial for the NBA, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1987 at D24. In the 1994-95 season, the average player salary
was about $1.35 million. Tom Notts, NBA Dribbling by Warning Signs, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995 at B1. By 2001, in what was supposed to be the final year
of a labor-management deal rejected by the players (but later agreed to after
further negotiations), the average player salary was projected to rise to about
$3 million. Id.
In baseball, in 1976, the average salary was $61,000. Davis Todd & Ann
Gregor, An Earning Explosion, McLEANs, Apr. 9, 1990 at 51. By 1994, the aver-
age baseball salary was $1.4 million per year. Eldon L. Ham, Agents - The
Good, the Bad, The Truth, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 17, 1997 at 6.
In football, the average NFL salary in 1980 was $79,000, and in 1996 it was
$735,000. Bob Glauber, Special Report; Life After Football, NEWSDAY, Jan. 16,
1997.
4. See sources cited supra note 3.
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of the professional sports union and its individual members
(represented individually within the parameters of the union
by agents).5
Despite the increased salaries (or perhaps because of
them), all is not well within the confines of the professional
sports world. Labor strife, extended strikes, lockouts and liti-
gation have become increasingly common. Because of the
uniqueness of the National Basketball Association ("NBA"),
and the recent movement for the decertification of the players
union, this comment will focus on the labor situation of pro-
fessional basketball.
Until the summer of 1995, the NBA had proudly re-
mained the only major sport never to have had a work stop-
page due to labor strife.7 But this changed when, after much
wrangling over a new collective bargaining agreement
("CBA"), ownership announced a lockout of its players on
June 30, 1995.8 In the midst of this turbulent setting, NBA
superstars Michael Jordan and Patrick Ewing led a move-
ment to decertify their own union.' Although the decertifica-
tion effort was unsuccessful, 10 notice was sent from within
the ranks of the NBA player's union that business as usual-
collective bargaining between union and management, which
5. Lawrence Shulruff, The Football Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985, at
45-47.
6. See Darryl Van Duch, NBA Vote Blocks Drive to Lift Antitrust Exemp-
tion, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at B1.
Major League Baseball owners canceled their season last year af-
ter talks with the players broke down. The league reluctantly began
its current season only after being forced last March by a federal dis-
trict judge and pressured by the National Labor Relations Board to
start playing without an agreement in place. The current labor con-
tracts in professional hockey and football were obtained only after the
parties underwent their own bouts of drawn out litigation, strikes,
lockouts and replacement games.
Id.
7. See Lee Shappell, It's History-NBA Locks Out Players, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
July 1, 1995 at C1. "The NBA, which never had a work stoppage and prided
itself on amicable labor relations, joined the tarnished age of professional sports
Friday. The NBA locked out its players and suspended basketball operations
until a collective bargaining agreement is reached." Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The players voted 226-134 to keep their union intact and approve a pro-
posed contract. See Steve Weston, NBA Union Prevails in Vote to Decertify:
Plan Nixed by Nearly 2-to-1 Margin, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1995, at El.
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usually led to myriad player restrictions, would no longer sat-
isfy all of the players.
Two recent courtroom losses11 and the ramifications of
those losses have arguably led at least indirectly to the ag-
gressive decertification movement by dissident members of
the NBA's players union. The Second Circuit's decision in
Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n12 upheld the legality of the
NBA's salary cap and college draft, rejecting Wood's claim
that these provisions violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. 13 The
Second Circuit's decision in National Basketball Ass'n v. Wil-
liams'4 affirmed the lower court's holding that "the antitrust
laws have no application to the collective bargaining negotia-
tions between [the] players and [the NBA] Teams." 5 These
decisions have had the effect of limiting the freedom of move-
ment and freedom of opportunity of professional basketball
players, some of the most highly skilled and highly talented
members of our society. The restrictions that the last several
CBAs have placed on these athletes,' 6 and the support that
these restrictions have received from the courts, led to the
decertification movement during the summer of 1995. These
same restrictions will certainly have a strong bearing on the
future of labor-management agreements between the owners
of professional basketball franchises and the members of the
NBA players association.
This comment examines, analyzes and proposes solu-
tions emanating from the holdings in Williams and Wood. 17
It provides a background by tracing the various challenges of
player restraints as violations of federal antitrust law.'" Af-
ter finding that such challenges have resulted in repeated
losses for the players associations, this comment includes a
discussion of the labor exemption as it pertains to profes-
sional sports,' 9 a history of the National Basketball Players
11. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); Wood
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
12. 809 F.2d at 954.
13. Id. at 956-57.
14. 45 F.3d at 684.
15. Id. at 685.
16. Specifically, these restrictions encompass the college draft, the right of
first refusal and the revenue sharing/salary cap system. Id.
17. See discussion infra Part II.C.
18. See discussion infra Part II.C.
19. See discussion infra Part II.A.
8231997]
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Association,2 0 a history of the attacks on the labor exemption,
a discussion of the successful decertification effort of the Na-
tional Football League,2" the differences between the NFL
union and the NBA union,22 and a discussion of the current
NBA CBA.
The particular problem addressed by this comment is
that the player restrictions which have been agreed to in col-
lective bargaining have impaired the ability of professional
basketball players to earn their market value.2 3 This com-
ment proposes that the players of the NBA decertify their
union in order to obtain their market value.24 This comment
suggests that the union decertification movement led by
Messrs. Jordan and Ewing is the only way that these su-
premely skilled performers can be paid their true market
value-that decertification is also the only way that these
performers can enjoy the fruits of a free market capitalist so-
ciety which other highly talented members of our society
enjoy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Background of Labor Exemption to Antitrust Laws
Antitrust law has been created primarily to promote
competition.25 The Sherman Act condemns "every contract
and combination in restraint of trade."26 While there is no
explicit language in the Act relating to union activity, many
early courts did in fact extend the Act to include it as inter-
ruptive of commercial activity.27 Because of the negative ef-
fects of these early decisions on the labor movement, unions
turned to Congress for protection.2 Eventually, Congress en-
acted the Clayton Act 29 and later the Norris-LaGuardia
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. See discussion infra Part II.E.
22. See discussion infra Part II.F.
23. See discussion infra Part III.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. D. Albert Daspin, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops:
Fouling Out the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95, 95 (1986).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
27. JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.04, at
528 (1979).
28. Id.
29. 20 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
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Act.3 0 These two acts provide a significant exemption for or-
ganized labor activities 31 and they attempt to foster the col-
lective bargaining process.32 Because the two ideals of anti-
trust and labor are essentially inimical,3 and due to the fact
that the statutes were drafted to protect specific union activ-
ity,34 the Supreme Court has created a non-statutory labor
exemption to allow the two ideals to exist alongside each
other.35
The major Supreme Court cases establishing this non-
statutory exemption all deal with management seeking anti-
trust immunity for actions supported by the unions,36
whereas in the arena of sports litigation, the unions are seek-
ing protection from actions supported by management.
3 7
Thus, the Supreme Court decisions deal mainly with protect-
ing union efforts, not protecting management from union de-
mands.38  The most significant case in this area is United
States v. Hutcheson,39 which dealt specifically with the legal-
ity of union pressure tactics on an employer. 40 The Supreme
Court, in holding that the union's activities were immune
from antitrust laws, effectively confirmed that there is a "con-
gressional intention to generally exempt legitimate union ac-
tivities from the restraints applicable to other combinations
having an adverse effect on competition."41
30. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).
31. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 27, § 5.04, at 528-29.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 5.04, at 529.
35. See Connell Constr. Co. Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1975) (denying non-statutory exemption when
labor policy is not promoted and there is substantial market impact); Local
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 681
(1965) (providing non-statutory exemption to bona-fide arms-length bargain-
ing); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (denying non-statutory exemp-
tion when market competition is eliminated); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union
No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 809 (1945) (denying exemption
when union and employer worked together to eliminate competition); United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941) (providing exemption if union
acts in self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups).
36. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 27, § 5.04, at 530.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 219.
40. Id. at 227.
41. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 27, § 5.04, at 531.
8251997]
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In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Bhd. of Elec.
Workers,4 2 price and product competition had essentially
been eliminated by an agreement between electrical workers,
manufacturers of electrical supplies and contractors.43 The
Court held that because the agreements under consideration
"were not simply collective bargaining agreements between a
union and an employer but included parties who seemingly
had neither an interest in nor control over the immediate em-
ployment relationship,"44 the agreements were not protected
by the labor exemption and were thus illegal restraints of
trade.45
While Allen Bradley clarified that agreements which in-
cluded parties outside the union-employer relationship were
outside the labor exemption, United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington46 and Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters v. Jewel Tea Co. 47 detailed the limits of the antitrust ex-
emption.41 In Pennington, the union and a multi-employer
bargaining unit entered into a CBA which contained various
agreements that the union would demand the same wages
from other employers as those received from the multi-em-
ployer bargaining unit.49 The Supreme Court held that
although all the matters agreed upon were within labor pol-
icy, because of "the attempt by the union and the employer
group to affect the costs and markets of operators who were
not parties to the agreement,"50 the CBA did not receive anti-
trust protection.
Similarly, Jewel Tea dealt with attempts to control mat-
ters beyond the employment relationship. 51 Despite the fact
that there was no conspiracy between the butcher's union
and employers to affect any other parties, the agreement re-
straining butcher working hours was struck down as a con-
spiracy in restraint of trade because it did severely and ad-
versely affect parties outside of the collective bargaining
42. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
43. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 27, § 5.04, at 532 (citing Allen Bradley,
325 U.S. at 798-801).
44. Id. at 533.
45. Id. at 532-33.
46. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
47. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
48. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 27, § 5.04, at 534.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. § 5.04, at 536.
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agreement. 52 Because all parts of the agreement were prop-
erly within the confines of collective bargaining, the Court
created a balancing test of interests in evaluating the appli-
cability of the antitrust laws.53 This balancing test focused
on the degree of restraint involved, the type of employee in-
terest at stake, the subject matter, and the immediacy and
directness of the employee interest.54
These cases show that "immunity will be available only
for those agreements arrived at between labor and manage-
ment."55 With respect to the sports industry, the most impor-
tant principle appears to be that "the Supreme Court seems
to have assumed that labor and management enjoy very
broad freedom to impose restraints upon themselves."56 The
additional fact that labor-management agreements in profes-
sional sports have no effect on the business markets will keep
courts from intervening in these disputes.57
While these cases defined the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion for businesses, Mackey v. National Football League"5 es-
tablished the standard for evaluating antitrust challenges in
professional sports. In Mackey,59 sixteen present and former
NFL players sued the NFL claiming that the league's enforce-
ment of the "Rozelle Rule"60 violated §§ 4 and 16 of the Clay-
ton Act and § 1 of the Sherman Act. The court, while admit-
ting that "the cases giving rise to the non-statutory
exemption are factually dissimilar from the present case,"6 '
created a three-pronged test to determine if limited non-stat-
utory immunity from antitrust review should be extended to
52. See id. at 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 381 U.S. 676.
53. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 27, § 5.04, at 536.
54. Id. § 5.04 at 536-37.
55. Id. § 5.04 at 540.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
59. Unilaterally adopted by the member clubs of the NFL, the "Rozelle
Rule" held that when a player signed a free agent contract with another team,
that other team owed compensation to the player's former team. If the two
teams could not decide adequate compensation, then the commissioner, Pete
Rozelle, determined adequate compensation. Id. at 610-11.
60. Id. at 606.
61. Id. at 613-15 & n.12 ("It is apparent that none of the prior cases is...
[on] point. They involve union-management agreements that work to the detri-
ment of management's competitors. In this case, petitioner urges that the re-
serve system works to the detriment of labor.") (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 294 (1972)).
19971 827
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
labor-management agreements in the sporting arena. 62
First, only the parties to the collective bargaining relation-
ship must be primarily affected by the restraint on trade.63
Second, the agreement sought to be exempted must concern a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining.64 Finally, the
agreement sought to be exempted must be the product of
bona-fide arm's length bargaining. 6 The requirements of
each prong must be met before antitrust immunity will be ex-
tended.66 Therefore, "whether the non-statutory exemption
will protect a particular agreement turns upon whether the
relevant federal labor policy is deserving of pre-eminence
over federal antitrust policy under the circumstances of the
particular case. "67 As Judge Duffy later held in Williams,
"Mackey also depends on a resolution of the conflicting labor
and antitrust policy concerns."68
In Williams, Judge Duffy reviewed four different tests
developed to determine the narrow issue of whether antitrust
immunity that existed while a CBA was in effect continues
after its formal expiration date.6 9 Judge Duffy first consid-
ered the "Bridgeman test" as developed in Bridgeman v. Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n.70 This test held that if the employer
"reasonably believes that the challenged practice or a close va-
riant of it will be incorporated" in the next CBA then the anti-
trust immunity survives as long as the "employer continues
to impose the restrictions unchanged."71 Next, Judge Duffy
considered the Powell /2 impasse standard, which allowed
62. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614-15 (8th Cir.
1976).
63. Id. at 614.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777, 782 (D. Minn.
1988) (citing Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 613 (8th Cir.
1976) ("Powell ").
68. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1074
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Williams I").
69. Id. at 1074-76. "I can find only four non-binding decisions addressing
this precise issue. Unfortunately, each decision fashioned a different standard
to apply." Id. at 1074.
70. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n., 675 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D.N.J.
1987), reviewed by Williams I, 857 F. Supp. 1069,1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
71. Williams I, 857 F. Supp. at 1075 (quoting Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. 960,
967 (D. N.J. 1987)).
72. Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 778.
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the labor exemption to continue only until impasse, defined
as "the point at which there appears no realistic possibility
that continuing discussions concerning the provision at issue
would be fruitful."73 Third was the Powell II17 standard (re-
versing Powell 1), holding that the non-statutory labor ex-
emption extends for as long as the labor relationship contin-
ues;75 and finally, the Brown 76 test, whereby the exemption
ceased upon expiration of the CBA.77
Judge Duffy attempted, via a thorough review of the ori-
gin of the non-statutory exemption, to ascertain which of
these four tests was the appropriate test to use in the specific
instance of an expired CBA.78 He held that "the appropriate
standard to apply is the Powell II [sic] standard. Antitrust
immunity exists as long as a collective bargaining relation-
ship exists. ' 79 Although Judge Duffy had before him only the
precise issue of whether the terms of an expired CBA contin-
ued without a new agreement, his broad holding as to the
continuation of antitrust immunity, and its affirmation by
the Second Circuit, confirmed that professional sports
leagues would not escape antitrust immunity as long as the
players associations continued to stay unionized."0
B. History of the National Basketball Players Association
("NBPA")
The growth of the NBPA roughly parallels that of the
NBA itself. The NBA began operation in 1946, an outgrowth
of several failed yet popular professional basketball
leagues.8" In the late 1950s, professional basketball was seen
as a growth-potential sport in this era of "new league and ex-
pansion" fever.8 2 Accordingly, the American Basketball
73. Williams 1, 857 F. Supp. at 1075 (citing Powell, 678 F.Supp. at 788).
74. Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (8th Cir.
1989) ("Powell III").
75. Id.
76. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 50
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
77. 782 F. Supp. at 130.
78. Williams I, 857 F. Supp. at 1074-78.
79. Id. at 1078. Judge Duffy erroneously calls "Powell III" "Powell II."
80. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Wil-
liams IfT).
81. ROBERT C. BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 154
(1986).
82. Id. at 155.
8291997]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
League ("ABL") began play in 1961.83 Although this new
league ceased operations early in its second year, 4 the mere
existence of the league had two major effects on professional
basketball. First, this new league resulted in an increase in
salaries as the leagues competed for players with skill and
gate appeal;8 5 second, the players acquired a heightened con-
fidence because of their increased salaries, resulting in an in-
creased interest in unionization in order to present their
views and obtain greater benefits.8 6 The NBPA, due in part
to this intra-league competition, was then formed in 1962.87
Although individual rights were increasing and working
conditions for the players were getting better in the early
1960s, it was not until the arrival of the truly competitive
American Basketball Association ("ABA") in 1967 that the
NBA ownership in fact recognized the NBPA and its individ-
ual players.8 8 According to congressional testimony by the
first executive director of the NBPA, Larry Fleisher, before
1967, the NBA had no collective bargaining agreement;8 9 the
league required no minimum salary, no pension, no health or
accident insurance, no life insurance, not even a trainer for
road games. 90
In the 1960s the NBPA was basically run by Mr. Fleisher
alone,9 ' and its "initial approaches stuck to basic labor issues:
minimum salary, pension fund, insurance benefits, and other
standard wage and condition of employment requests.9 2 In
fact, the 1960s saw no litigation emanating from the NBPA,93
nor were any games missed due to labor-management dis-
agreements.94 This streak remains alive to this day, an
amazing feat considering the labor strife that has nagged at
professional football, baseball and hockey over the years. 95
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 155-56.
86. Id.
87. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 27, § 5.04, at 778 n.7.
88. Id. § 5.04 at 778.
89. BERRY ET AL., supra note 81, at 157.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 158.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. Although in the summer of 1995, the NBA did suffer a work stop-
page due to CBA negotiations that went sour. Shappell, supra note 7. How-
ever, a CBA was reached in the fall of 1995. What's the Deal?, supra note 3.
95. See Shappell, supra note 7.
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C. Attacks on the Antitrust Exemption by the NBPA
1. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n: The First
Attack on the Antitrust Exemption
Despite the fact that professional basketball has been
relatively strife-free, the NBA has not been free of player led
attacks on its antitrust exemption. Seemingly emboldened
by unionization, the 1967 CBA between players and manage-
ment, and the salary competition from the ABL and then the
ABA, several NBA players brought a class action suit in 1970
against the NBA alleging that the college draft, the reserve
clause and other restrictions violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act and §§ 4 and 6 of the Clayton Act.96
This suit, Robertson v. NBA,9 7 additionally challenged
the then-proposed NBA-ABA merger. 98 Responding to pre-
liminary orders issued by Judge Carter that indicated to the
owners that the judge doubted that the player draft and the
player reserve system could withstand a Sherman Act at-
tack,99 the owners and players resumed their collective bar-
gaining and entered into a new CBA as part of the settlement
of the Robertson suit.100 In addition to approving the ABA-
NBA merger, this settlement paved the way for the resump-
tion of "give-and-take" negotiating associated with good faith
collective bargaining. 110 As a result of this bargaining, the
players gained a matter of increased mobility, and the owners
were able to control player movement to some extent.10 2 This
1976 CBA-emanating from the Robertson settlement-was
96. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 872 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). The college draft is the process by which exclusive rights to negotiate
with eligible college players are apportioned among the NBA teams. In general
the college draft allows teams with the worst records to select earlier than
teams with better records. A player who is drafted by a particular team may
negotiate only with that team. A player who is not drafted may negotiate with
any team. A Reserve Clause is a clause which allows owners the option of re-
newing a player's contract ad infinitum at a salary determined by the owner.
97. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 872.
98. Id.
99. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 27, § 5.04, at 507.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The draft was maintained, although teams no longer had perpetual
rights to the players that they drafted, rather, they had these rights for one
year only. Id.
1997] 831
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meant to create an eleven year plan for handling free
agency.
10 3
2. Lanier v. National Basketball Ass'n: Attack on the
Legality of the Salary Cap
The 1983 salary cap was part of a jointly agreed upon
modification of the CBA after the 1976 Robertson settlement
between the NBA and the NBPA.' 4 The purpose of the 1983
modification, mainly the salary cap, was "to insure the finan-
cial stability of troubled NBA teams, improve competitive
balance and at the same time preserve and improve the basic
framework of the [Robertson] Settlement Agreement." 10 5
The salary cap limits the total amount that NBA teams
can pay its individual players. 10 6 The players are guaranteed
fifty-three percent of the league's gross revenues10 7 in return
for accepting the cap.108
When the NBA sought to introduce the salary cap in
1983, several players filed suit in Lanier v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n'0 9 challenging its legality. After a determination
by a special master that the cap would violate the terms of
the Robertson settlement agreement, and could not be im-
posed without a modification of the existing CBA, the player's
union relented and granted the owner's demands to imple-
ment the salary cap and entered into a new CBA that in-
cluded the cap. 110 This CBA continued through completion of
the 1986-87 season."'
103. Jeffrey D. Schneider, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Lack of Free
Agency In The NFL, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 828 (1991) (quoting the 1976 NBA
Collective Bargaining Agreement).
104. In re National Basketball Ass'n, 630 F. Supp. 136, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
105. Id. See also Aff. of David Stern at 3, Ex. 1, Aff. of Gary Bettman. In re
National Basketball Ass'n, 630 F. Supp. 136 (No.70-1526).
106. Id. at 137.
107. See Schneider, supra note 103, at 839, n.308 (explaining gross revenues
include regular season gate receipts, proceeds from the licensing of broadcast
rights, and all proceeds from playoff and exhibition games).
108. Brenton Welling et al., Basketball: Business is Booming, Bus. WEEK,
Oct. 28, 1985, at 78.
109. 82 Civ. 4935 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) quoted in Bridgeman v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D.N.J. 1987).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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3. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n: Attack on the
Player Draft and the Salary Cap as Restraints
of Trade
In June of 1984, Leon Wood, a gold medal winner on the
Olympic team and an all-American at California State Uni-
versity, Fullerton, was taken in the first round of the NBA
draft by the Philadelphia 76ers. 112 It was against this back-
drop that Leon Wood filed suit in Wood v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n." 3 Wood developed four arguments to prove that
the draft and salary cap were illegal, each of which was dis-
posed of by the court. 114 Initially, Wood argued that his supe-
rior abilities, as evidenced by his selection in the first round
of the NBA draft, should enable him to bargain individu-
ally.115 The court disposed of this argument by relying on the
collective bargaining relationship between the NBPA and the
NBA, noting that "Wood's theory would allow any employee
dissatisfied with his salary relative to those of other workers
to insist upon individual bargaining, contrary to explicit fed-
eral labor policy." 1" 6
Second, Wood attacked the salary cap and the draft be-
cause these two devices allowed him no choice of where he
could work, and forced him to work for below market
wages. 11 7 The court refuted this argument by an analogy to
the "hiring hall" mechanism. 118
Wood's third argument was that the draft and the salary
cap disadvantaged him since he was a new employee. 119
Once again the court relied on analogizing Wood's position to
that of the industrial worker. 120
Fourth and finally, Wood argued that the draft and sal-
ary cap were illegal because they affected employees outside
112. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 956-58 (2d Cir. 1987).
113. Id. at 954.
114. Id. at 960.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Wood, 809 F.2d at 960. The union-operated "hiring hall" receives re-
quests for workers from employees. It provides workers who are qualified and
available for industries such as construction, which are characterized by irregu-
lar and short-lived employment. Stephen Evans & Roy Lewis, Union Organiza-
tion, Collective Bargaining and the Law, 10 CoMP. LAB. L. 473, 479 & n.22
(1989).
119. Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
120. Id.
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the bargaining unit.' 2 ' Once again, the court relied on the
collective bargaining process in stating that this practice "is
also a commonplace consequence of collective agreements,"
and "[i]ndeed, the National Labor Relations Act explicitly de-
fines 'employee' in a way that includes workers outside the
bargaining unit."'22
The Second Circuit, in disposing of Wood's claim, relied
entirely on the fact that the restrictions which Wood was try-
ing to get out from under were the product of collective bar-
gaining. 2 3 This reliance allowed the court to uphold the re-
strictions, even while admitting that these restrictions
harmed Wood; "[it is true that the combination of the draft
and salary cap places new players coming out of the college
ranks at a disadvantage. However, as noted earlier, that is
hardly an unusual feature of collective agreements." 24
4. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n: Another
Challenge to the Salary Cap and Player Draft
Upon expiration of the 1983 agreement in June of 1987
(a mere five months after the Wood decision), and after the
expiration of an additional four month moratorium designed
to facilitate negotiations between the parties, 125 various play-
ers filed suit in Bridgeman v. National Basketball Assn. 126
Again the players were challenging the college draft, the
right of first refusal, and the salary cap as violations of anti-
trust law.' 27 But, once again, the players' own union agreed
to a collective bargaining agreement as part of the settlement
of this suit which continued all three practices, albeit in mod-
ified form. 128 This CBA went into effect on November 1, 1988
and expired on June 23, 1994, the day after the last playoff
game of that season.' 29
121. Id.
122. Id. citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
123. Id. at 962.
124. Id.
125. "On June 8, 1987, the NBA and the Players entered into a Moratorium
Agreement to facilitate negotiations, whereby the challenged practices would
remain in effect but no new contracts would be signed. The Moratorium Agree-
ment expired on October 1, 1987." Williams I, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1072
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
126. 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987).
127. Williams 1, 857 F. Supp. at 1072.
128. Id. at 1072.
129. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995).
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5. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams: Expiration
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
A suit challenging the same restrictions as those chal-
lenged in Wood and Bridgeman was brought eight years later
in National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams.130 In Williams the
collective bargaining agreement signed in 1988 had expired
on June 23, 1994. The twenty seven NBA teams brought suit
against numerous individual players seeking a declaratory
judgment "that the continued imposition of the disputed pro-
visions of the CBA (namely the college draft and the salary
cap) would not violate the antitrust laws because that imposi-
tion 'is governed solely by the labor laws and is exempt from
antitrust liability under the non-statutory exemption to the
antitrust laws.' '131
D. Prelude to the Decertification Effort
When the 1988 CBA expired in 1994, the NBA was at an
all-time high in terms of popularity and profitability. It
seemed that the end of the salary cap, if not the draft, was at
hand. And most importantly, union leadership apparently
could see that the cap had run its course. Charles Grantham
(the executive director of the NBPA at that time), commented
that "[tihe cap is a dinosaur[;] [i]t's outlived it's [sic] useful-
ness. The cap was instituted when the league was in finan-
cial trouble. That's no longer the case .... , Grantham
had held this position since at least August of 1992, when
Washington Bullets' draftee Tom Gugliotta, the sixth pick in
the 1992 draft, was forced to consider the option of playing
his rookie year in Italy so that he could achieve what he con-
sidered to be his market value.133 At the time Grantham
commented, "[tihe salary cap has simply outlived its useful-
ness . . .The Gugliotta situation is just another example.
And you're going to see more of that, not less, until something
is done."' 34
130. Id.
131. Id. at 686.
132. George Diaz, Salary Caps: Picking Out the Real Losers, ORLANDO SEN-
TINEL, Aug. 7, 1994, at C10.
133. Tim Povtak, Gugliotta is A Victim of the Outdated Cap, SPORTING NEWS,
Aug. 24, 1992, at 43.
134. Id.
1997] 835
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Because the management and the players were so far
apart on key issues, such as the salary cap and the draft, the
parties had not reached a deal on a new collective bargaining
agreement as the beginning of the 1994-95 season ap-
proached.135 In view of this inability to reach an agreement
and with the season approaching, both sides, seeking to avoid
the labor strife witnessed recently in other professional
sports leagues, signed a no-lockout, no-strike agreement that
guaranteed that the 1994-95 season would be played in its
entirety. 136 This no-lockout, no-strike agreement came while
an appeal of National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams 3 7 was
pending.
In Williams, the NBA commenced a declaratory action on
June 17, 1994 seeking the continued implementation of the
college draft, the right of first refusal, and the salary cap. 138
The defendant players, along with the NBPA, counterclaimed
alleging that the draft, the right of first refusal and the salary
cap were unreasonable restraints of trade which were not ex-
empt from antitrust law and therefore violated the Sherman
Act. 13
9
Judge Duffy granted the NBA's injunction and, using the
Powell III beyond impasse standard, allowed the continued
implementation of the draft, the salary cap and the right of
first refusal. 140 He granted this injunction in reliance on the
fact that a collective bargaining relationship existed between
the NBPA and the NBA.1 4 1 This signaled again, and this
time with finality, that the players would be unable to escape
the restrictions of previous agreements without decertifica-
tion of its union.142 Judge Duffy virtually stated this proposi-
tion himself in holding that the players were not "stuck" with
the provisions forever. 143 The players, he argued, could exert
economic pressure on the owners by striking14 4 or,
135. Tim Povtak, NBA Deal Blocks Stoppage, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 28,
1994, at D1.
136. Id.
137. Williams I, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
138. Id. at 1071.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1079.
141. Id. at 1078-79.
142. Id. at 1078.
143. Williams I, 857 F. Supp. at 1078.
144. Id.
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the Players may request decertification of the NBPA as a
collective bargaining agent. I do not mean by this ruling
to encourage the Players to decertify their union so that
they may bring an antitrust claim. But, decertification is
certainly an option the Players have. In fact, this is ex-
actly what the National Football League Players Union
did following Powell II [sic]."'
The NFL's decertification movement following Powell III
resulted in the first meaningful free agency accorded to the
players of the NFL, 46 followed by what was clearly the best
collective bargaining agreement the players had reached to
date with the NFL.'47 For professional athletes, case history
shows that when a CBA exists between a players union and
management, antitrust liability is unavailable to the players
to do away with collectively bargained for provisions such as
the draft, the salary cap and the right of first refusal.
E. NFL Decertification Following Powell III
Originally, the NFL decertification movement began
with Powell v. National Football League 4 ("Powell I").' In
1987, following the expiration of the 1982 CBA and the in-
ability of the parties to agree on a new CBA, the players of
the National Football League went on strike. 50 Powell I was
a class action suit brought by numerous players after this
strike failed and the players returned to work.151 The players
had sought an injunction to prevent the National Football
145. Id. Judge Duffy erroneously calls "Powell III" "Powell I."
146. Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
To avoid confusion with other Powell cases, in the text of my comment I will
refer to this case as the Powell-McNeill case.
147. White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993).
148. 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989),
and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
149. "Powell I" is the ruling establishing the impasse standard. Id. "Powell
I is the ruling determining the date of impasse between the parties. Powell v.
National Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988). Finally, "Powell
III" is the holding establishing the "beyond impasse" standard, Powell v. Na-
tional Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1040 (1991). In various law review articles and even judicial rulings "Powell
IPr is incorrectly called "Powell H."
150. See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional
Sports, 1989 DuKE L.J. 339 (1989).
151. See Powell 1, 678 F. Supp. at 777.
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League from imposing the player restrictions from the previ-
ous, but now expired, CBA.' 52
Judge Doty of the District Court of Minnesota, with only
Bridgeman153 and its "reasonable belief' test as precedent,
decided that while immunity from antitrust exemption does
not expire when the CBA expires, it does not continue indefi-
nitely. 154 Judge Doty created the impasse standard test.
This test held that the antitrust exemption continued until
"there appears no realistic possibility that continuing discus-
sions concerning the provision at issue would be fruitful." 5
By this ruling, the NFL players had a slight opportunity to
escape from restrictive structures of a previous agreement.
By bargaining in good faith until there was an impasse on an
issue or a variety of issues, the players could at some point
gain an injunction from the imposition of these restrictions.
But Powell I was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Powell III. 156 The Eighth Circuit created
the "beyond impasse" standard, whereby the non-statutory
labor exemption extended beyond a "mere impasse" (Powell I)
but rather, for as long as the labor relationship continued. 57
Thus, "[tihe Eighth Circuit reasoned that once a collective
bargaining relationship is established, federal labor policies
become pre-eminent."' Therefore, as long as the individual
players of the NFL were represented by the National Football
League Players Association (NFLPA) the NFL could, absent a
new agreement, unilaterally impose conditions from the pre-
vious agreement onto the players and antitrust immunity
would continue, unfettered. Obviously, this resulted in a sub-
stantial increase in the bargaining power of the owners.
Judge Heaney in his dissent recognized the illogical na-
ture of this reasoning and stated that "the end result of the
majority opinion is that once a union agrees to a package of
player restraints, it will be bound to that package forever un-
152. See id.
153. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J.
1987).
154. Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 786-88.
155. Id. at 788.
156. Powell III, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1040 (1991).
157. Id. at 1293, 1303-04.
158. Williams 1, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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less the union forfeits its bargaining rights."159 Further,
Judge Lay, in a dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc,
wrote that "the union should not be compelled, short of self-
destruction, to accept illegal restraints it deems undesir-
able."160 But what followed the ruling of the Eighth Circuit
provides an indication of the potential for a decertified Na-
tional Basketball Players Association.
The NFL players, having operated without a CBA for two
years, and facing the prospect of the unilateral imposition of
the restrictive terms of the previous CBA continuing for an
infinite period, chose to decertify their own union. 16 Despite
arguments by the NFL that this decertification process was
not genuine and/or insufficient to end the labor exemption,
62
the Powell-McNeil court held that "the existence of a bargain-
ing relationship does not depend on NLRB certification, but
rather depends on whether a majority of the employees in a
bargaining unit supports a particular union as their bargain-
ing representative." 163 The majority (sixty-two percent) of
the players signed petitions revoking the authority of the
NFLPA to engage in collective bargaining on their behalf.'
64
On December 5, 1989, player representatives from all of the
NFL teams voted unanimously to end the NFLPA's status
and restructure the organization as a voluntary professional
organization. 16
5
This official decertification led to the filing of Powell-Mc-
Neil. 166 In Powell-McNeil the plaintiffs were eight football
players whose contracts had expired on February 1, 1990.167
These players alleged that the defendants violated § 1 of the
Sherman Act via illegal restraints under the NFL's Plan B
system of free agency during the 1990-91 season.16 8 Because
159. Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559, 570 (8th Cir. 1989)
(Heaney, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 574 (Lay, J. dissenting).
161. Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn.
1991).
162. Id. at 1354-56.
163. Id. at 1357.
164. Id. at 1356.
165. Id. at 1354.
166. See id.
167. Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1353.
168. Id. at 1353-54. Plan B allowed each team to reserve 37 players on their
roster and subject these players to the Right of First Refusal/Compensation
System. Those not deemed reserved were unrestricted free agents. Shant H.
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the NFLPA had been decertified, the court held that there
was no ongoing collective bargaining relationship with the
NFL, and thus the non-statutory labor exemption had
ended. 169 The court thus granted the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment striking the defendants' labor exemption
defenses, and allowed the case to proceed to trial. 170
At trial,
[tihe jury found that the Right of First Refusal/Compensa-
tion Rules in Plan B [had] a substantially harmful effect
on competition in the relevant market for the services of
professional football players, that those rules significantly
contribute[d] to competitive balance in the NFL, but that
the rules [were] more restrictive than reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the objective of establishing or maintain-
ing competitive balance in the NFL.1 7 1
The jury also found that all of the plaintiffs had suffered
economic injury. 172 The jury had spoken and ruled that the
NFL's Plan B system of free agency which restricted the play-
ers had caused the players economic harm, of varying de-
grees. 1 73 Therefore, the restrictive portions of the most re-
cent NFL CBA were deemed to be injurious to the plaintiffs
when the antitrust shield of collective bargaining was re-
moved. Effectively and appropriately seen as one of the first
courtroom victories by the players over management, the
Powell-McNeil verdict spawned further player lawsuits to
take advantage of the NFL's lack of an antitrust shield. 74
Four days after the jury verdict in Powell-McNeil was an-
nounced, Jackson v. National Football League 75 was filed,
with essentially the same claims as those of the Powell-Mc-
Chalian, Fourth And Goal: Player Restraints In Professional Sports, a Look
Back and a Look Ahead, 67 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 593, 618-19 (1993).
169. Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
170. Id. at 1359.
171. Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 229 n.2 (D.
Minn. 1992).
172. Id.
173. Id. The jury awarded the following damages to plaintiffs: Mark Collins,
$178,000; Don Majkowski, $0; Tim McDonald, $0; Freeman McNeil, $0; Frank
Minnifield, $50,000; Niko Noga, $0; Dave Richards, $240,000; and Lee Rouson,
$75,000. Id.
174. See Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatu-
tory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 1045, 1064
(1994).
175. Jackson, 802 F. Supp. at 226.
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Neil plaintiffs.' 76 The District Court, in an order dated Sep-
tember 24, 1992, granted a temporary restraining order to
the four players in the suit who remained unsigned.
177
This restraining order temporarily enjoined the defend-
ants for five days from enforcing Plan B,' 7 8 thus effectively
making these players free agents with the ability to sign with
any team with no compensation flowing back to their former
teams. The court based this injunction on the probability of
the plaintiffs' success on the merits; 79 the plaintiffs' suffi-
cient showing that without the injunction they would suffer
irreparable harm;' the fact that the plaintiffs stood to suffer
greater harm than the defendants without the injunction;' 8'
and finally, the fact that the public interest would be better
served by granting the injunction, since the players sacrificed
union representation and the protection of the labor laws to
pursue their antitrust remedies, and denying the injunction
may have subverted the labor policies.1
8 2
In addition to Jackson, on September 21, 1992 (less than
two weeks after the Powell-McNeil jury verdict but three
days before the Jackson injunction), a class action suit, White
v. National Football League,'8 3 was filed on behalf of five
named plaintiffs' and a class of NFL players.'8 5 These
players sought free agency and the award of treble damages
176. Id. at 228. Ten NFL players sought relief for economic injuries suffered
as a result of defendants' Right of First Refusal/Compensation Rules of Plan B.
The plaintiffs' contracts had all expired on February 1, 1992, and via Plan B, all
of the plaintiffs' former teams gained the exclusive rights to plaintiffs' services.
Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 235.
179. Id. at 229-30.
180. Id. at 230-31.
181. Jackson, 802 F. Supp. at 231-32.
182. Id. at 233.
183. 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993).
184. Reggie White, Michael Buck, Hardy Nickerson, Vann McElroy, and
Dave Duerson. Id.
185. Id. at 1395. The class included:
(i) all players who have been, are now, or will be under contract to play
professional football for an NFL club at any time from August 31, 1987
to the date of final judgment in this action and determination of any
appeal therefrom, and (ii) all college and other football players who, as
of August 31, 1987, to the date of final judgment in this action and the
determination of any appeal there from, have been, are now, or will be
eligible to play football as a rookie for an NFL team.
Id. at 1395 n.4.
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(for damages suffered because of the NFL's Plan B method of
limited free agency) upon expiration of their contracts on
February 1, 1993.186 The combination of losses sustained
previously in the Powell-McNeil and Jackson cases, the pros-
pect of an unprecedented number of free agents within the
league, and the looming threat of treble damages for the 1100
members of the White class with Plan B damage claims effec-
tively caused the NFL to come back to the bargaining table by
way of the class settlement in White.i8 7 This settlement
called for the NFL to pay $195 million in damages and costs
to the members of the White class and plaintiffs in other re-
lated litigation.188 But of greater importance is that the
White settlement, gained only after decertification of the
players own union and subsequent court victories, provided
the most significant amount of free agency in the history of
the NFL.
The settlement provided that, with the exception of
"franchise"1s9 and "transition"190 players, "all players with at
least five years of NFL experience whose contracts have ex-
pired may negotiate and enter into contracts with NFL teams
as unrestricted free agents."191 Players with less than five
years of NFL experience were subject to various restrictions
on their movement upon expiration of their contracts. 9 2 The
significance of the White settlement was that after five years
of court fights with the NFL (since the expiration of the 1982
186. Id. at 1395.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1414.
189. [Each NFL] team is permitted to designate one Franchise Player
by tendering an offer of a one year contract at a salary amounting to
the greater of (1) the average of the salaries of the five highest paid
players at the designated player's same position, or (2) a twenty per-
cent increase in the designated player's previous year's salary. A team
thereby obtains exclusive negotiating rights to the Franchise Player,
notwithstanding his years of experience.
White, 822 F. Supp. at 1413.
190. A transition player is determined by the team when that team tenders
an offer of a one year contract at a salary amounting to the greater of
(1) the average of the salaries of the ten highest paid players at the
designated player's same position, or (2) a twenty percent increase in
the designated player's previous year's salary. A team thereby obtains
a RFR (right of first refusal) with respect to the transition player,
notwithstanding his years of experience.
Id.
191. Id. at 1412.
192. Id. at 1412-13.
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CBA) professional football players for the first time were
granted unrestricted free agency at certain levels. These
players obtained this free agency only after: (1) decertifying
their union, (2) obtaining a ruling that the non-statutory la-
bor exemption did not apply when labor no longer was repre-
sented by a union, (3) winning a jury trial that found that the
players had suffered harm, and (4) after the startling reality
for the league that hundreds of players could be granted un-
restricted free agency in White if the NFL continued its losing
streak.
Additionally, the settlement provided for a substantially
limited player draft, 9 3 anti-collusion provisions, 9 and court
supervision over enforcement of the settlement itself.195 On
the other hand, the players relented to a team salary cap and
a limited entering player pool,19 6 but the outcome was that a
"radically modified player reservation system that provide[d]
for substantial unrestricted free agency for veteran play-
ers"197 was obtained only through decertification and the re-
moval of the antitrust exemption. 9 8
F. Differences between NFLPA and NBPA
On January 6, 1993, an agreement in principle was
reached to settle the White class action and other related liti-
gation.199 At this point, the NFLPA began efforts to recertify
itself as the collective bargaining agent of the NFL players.
20 0
By the end of March, 1993, the NFLPA was again unionized,
and was recognized by the NFL "as the sole and exclusive col-
193. Id. at 1413.
194. Id. at 1414.
Anti-collusion provisions prohibited the NFL and any NFL member
team from agreeing with any other team regarding: (1) the decision to
negotiate or not to negotiate with any player; (2) the decision to submit
or not submit an offer sheet to any restricted free agent; (3) the deci-
sion to offer or not to offer a contract to any player; (4) the decision to
exercise or not to exercise a right of first refusal; or (5) the terms or
conditions of employment offered to any individual player for inclusion
in a player contract.
Id.
195. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1414.
196. Id. at 1413-14.
197. Id. at 1419.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1435.
200. Id.
8431997]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
lective bargaining representative of present and future em-
ployee players in the NFL."210
1. Fungible v. Non-Fungible Players
Generally, professional athletes can be divided into two
types: fungible and non-fungible players.20 2 Non-fungible
players are the stars, those rare players who make an imme-
diate impact on their team's win-loss record or financial suc-
cess.2"' Fungible players are those who are easily replaced,
whose individual presence rarely effects the win-loss record
and/or profits. 20 4 Because football requires an on-field team
of eleven where only the quarterback, running back, and pos-
sibly a wide receiver or a truly superior (and truly rare) de-
fensive player are actually non-fungible, the NFL consists
greatly of fungible, easily replaced players. Thus, the major-
ity of players, those who never touch the ball, score touch-
downs, or make a noticeable impact, are for the most part ex-
pendable and their salaries would be driven down without
the presence of a union. Obviously, the rare non-fungible
player in the NFL would benefit tremendously from decertifi-
cation, for his talents would be available to the leagues high-
est bidder from the day he renounced his collegiate eligibility.
Basketball players, on the other hand, would actually
thrive en masse without the presence of a union because they
are all non-fungible. In basketball, each team has only five
players on the court, each of which has the same opportunity
to be dominant. In fact, in the past decade, championship
teams have been led by players from all five positions.20 5 Ad-
ditionally, because of the smaller rosters (basketball has
201. White, 822 F. Supp. at 1435.
202. Schneider, supra note 103, at 847.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. The five basketball positions, in modem day parlance are: point guard,
off guard, small forward, power forward, and center. In fact, in basketball, ar-
guably the five biggest stars of the past decade played different positions. At
point guard, Magic Johnson led the Los Angeles Lakers to four NBA champion-
ships; at off guard, Michael Jordan has led the Chicago Bulls to four champion-
ships; at small-forward, Julius Erving revolutionized the game while leading
the Philadelphia 76ers to a world championship; at power forward, the versatile
Larry Bird (a hybrid power-forward-small forward) led the Boston Celtics to
three championships; and at center, Hakeem Olajuwon has led the Houston
Rockets to two world championships. Before the era of specialization, basket-
ball positions were labeled merely guard, forward and center.
844 [Vol. 37
NBPA DECERTIFICATION
twelve players on each roster, while football has fifty-three),
the NBA would not have the potential for huge numbers of
fungible players shuttling aimlessly between franchises.
Football players also face the perils of an extremely vio-
lent profession where serious injury is fairly commonplace.2 °s
The NFLPA is needed to protect the rights of these players
during and after their extremely brief careers.
To the average player.., who may have a brief career and
crippling knee pain thereafter, the guarantees provided
by the CBA are extremely important. If the purpose of a
union is to make life better for its membership as a whole
and to protect its members from management abuses, dis-
solving the NFLPA for the express purpose of creating
free agency is a mistake.
20 7
The NBA, despite the large stature of its players and the
physical style of play, is essentially a non-violent sport,
whose players enjoy longer careers than NFL players.20 8
Finally, the tremendous growth and popularity of college
basketball in the past decade has made individual players en-
tering professional basketball highly marketable entities on
their own, and not in need of the protection of the union.20 9
In fact, the union did a disservice to these athletes when it
agreed to the latest CBA which placed a cap on rookie sala-
ries. This rookie cap is a glaring example of the NBPA doing
exactly the opposite of what unions were created for: "to
make life better for its membership . . .and to protect its
members from management abuse."210 The NBPA has put its
206. See Schneider, supra note 103, at 847.
207. Id. at 847-48.
208. The average playing career in the NFL is less than four years. See
Aaron Bernstein, Football Owners May Be Sacked by a Jury, Bus. WK., June
22, 1992 at 42. Further, studies show that 65% of NFL players suffer perma-
nent injuries and the life expectancy of a professional football player is approxi-
mately 60 years, compared to 72 years for the average male. See Joe Urschel,
Football Fever Is Hazardous to Our Health, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb.2, 1993 at A10.
On the other hand, the average career length for NBA players between 1977
and 1992 was 4.5 years. Lawrence DeBrock, Wallace Hendricks, & Roger
Koenker, The Economics of Persistence: Graduation Rates of Athletes as Labor
Market Choice, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 512 (1996).
209. See D. Albert Daspin, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops:
Fouling Out the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95, 110 n.99 (1986). "Top draft
choices, in some sports, are accustomed to receiving upwards of forty million
dollars in compensation. Considered alongside endorsement revenues, these
figures suggest that today's top round draft picks are themselves commercial
entities deserving of Sherman Act protection." Id.
210. See Schneider, supra note 103, at 847-48.
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membership in the odd position of having to seek protection
from its own union.
For the above reasons, the risks that professional basket-
ball players would take by decertifying their union are rela-
tively slight in comparison to the great risks that football
players would face with a permanently decertified union.
G. Current Terms of the NBA CBA
At the conclusion of the 1994-95 NBA season, the one
year no-lockout, no strike moratorium had expired.21' On
June 21, 1995, several players, led by Michael Jordan and
Patrick Ewing, petitioned the National Labor Relations
Board to decertify the players association, complaining that
the union had not kept them informed about negotiations.2 12
Later that day NBA Commissioner David Stern and NBPA
Executive Director Simon Gourdine announced a tentative
agreement on a new six-year labor deal.213 On June 23, the
team owners unanimously approved the collectively bar-
gained for labor deal,21 4 but the players tabled a vote on the
proposal, asking that union leadership reopen negotiations
with the league.2 15 On June 30, 1995, the NBA owners an-
nounced a player lockout to begin that day.21 6
Given the reality that attacks on the non-statutory labor
exemption fail consistently,21 7 and that the NFL had gained
several courtroom victories against the exemption after union
sponsored decertification 21 1 along with a successful court in-
spired settlement,21 9 numerous elite NBA players pressed for
decertification of the union to escape what they felt was a dis-
advantageous labor agreement.220 Simultaneously, Ewing
211. Shappell, supra note 7.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Powell I, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988); Williams I, 857 F.
Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954
(2d Cir. 1987).
218. See Powell v. National Football League, 765 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn.
1991); Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992).
219. See White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn.
1993).
220. Murray Chass, Six-Year NBA Labor Deal Waits for Ratification, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 22, 1995 at B7.
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filed suit seeking to restructure the salary cap, revenue-shar-
ing methodology, free-agency rules and the college draft.2 2'
Mysteriously, the original labor agreement proposed on
June 21, 1995 was shrouded in secrecy and ratified surpris-
ingly quickly by the players association.222 Players leading
the decertification movement (and their agents) were both-
ered by the seeming urgency to get the agreement, the little
time allotted the player representatives to discuss the terms
with their teammates, and the urgency of the subsequent rat-
ification vote.22 3 With the decertification movement gather-
ing momentum, the two sides returned to the bargaining ta-
ble and, in circumstances extremely similar to those seen
after the filing of the White suit in the NFL, the players ob-
tained a better agreement.2 24 Obviously the threat of decer-
tification and its inherent risks were greater than the risks
contained in this second agreement.225 Although this second
agreement has yet to be officially put in writing,226 the play-
ers obtained management concession on several major issues
in the second agreement. Concessions include the elimina-
tion of the proposed luxury tax,227 a $1 million exception for
teams over the payroll cap to sign free agents,228 the addition
of a modified "Larry Bird" exception for players who have
221. Ewing v. National Basketball Ass'n, No. 4-95-411 (D. Minn. 1995).
222. Chass, Six-Year NBA Labor Deal, supra note 219.
Late yesterday afternoon, Simon Gourdine, the union's executive
director, said no agreement had been reached and that there were four
to six issues, including "a couple of really tough ones," left to be re-
solved. Less than six hours later, he and Russ Granik, the N.B.A dep-
uty commissioner, jointly announced the agreement.
Even as Gourdine was saying there was not yet a deal, he talked of
using Federal Express to deliver term sheets outlining details of the
agreement to all players by today so the player representatives can be
prepared for the ratification meeting tomorrow.
Id.
223. Id.
224. Murray Chass, N.B.A. Owners Settled Rather Than Risk More, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1995, at Bl. "Commissioner David Stern said the agreement
was riskier for the owners than the first deal the two sides made in vain in
June." Id.
225. Id. NBA Commissioner David Stern said: "I didn't want to face the risk
of what decertification would bring." Id.
226. Mike Monroe, Listen Up: Jordan Says Jordan is Back, DENVER POST,
Dec. 17, 1995, at C13.
227. Chass, N.B.A. Owners, supra note 224.
228. Id.
19971
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
completed two seasons with the same team,229 and the league
dropping its threatened demand for the minimum payroll to
be 60% of the payroll cap, keeping it at the 75% minimum of
the June 21 agreement (although down from the 80% mini-
mum of the expired agreement).230 The owners do have the
option of reopening the agreement in three years, however. 231
If not reopened, the latest six-year deal will not expire until
after the 2000-2001 season.232
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Professional basketball players are extremely well paid.
On this there is no disagreement. Somehow, the players have
managed to attain these salaries despite years of restrictions
on their earning power and freedom of opportunity via the
player draft, free agency restrictions, and the salary cap, to
name a few. Without these restrictions, how much would
they earn, how much could they earn? There are very few
questions of this ilk being asked concerning people employed
in the world of law, medicine, and business. In these well
paying, professional fields, the unbridled competition of the
free market allows people the ability to garner the highest
possible salary in the location that they choose to work in.
On the other hand, the common worker, with few distinc-
tive and/or marketable skills seeks the protection of a union
to guarantee certain wages and benefits. Unions were devel-
oped for the singular purpose of protecting workers from
management abuse concerning salary and working
conditions.
Thirty years ago, professional basketball players faced
management abuse as the NBA and other professional bas-
ketball leagues developed.2 3 To escape this abuse the play-
ers unionized, and the past thirty years, with the exception of
various fits and starts, has seen a tremendous growth in the
popularity of the league and a tremendous growth in player
salaries.
229. Id. The "Larry Bird" exception allows teams to re-sign their veteran
free agents without regard for the salary cap.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Dave Krieger, NBA's County Fair Opens for Business, RocKY MouN-
TAIN NEWS, July, 12, 1996 at IC.
233. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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But now, these players are actually restricted by the
presence of their union because courts refuse to interfere
with the collective bargaining process and rule on obvious re-
straints of trade present in CBAs.234 The rulings in Wood,
Bridgeman and Williams all relied on the fact that arms
length collective bargaining had taken place between the
players union and management.235 These cases all upheld
various restraints of trade that restricted the players freedom
of opportunity.236 The courts are correct in relying on the fact
that arms length collective bargaining took place in agreeing
to the CBAs, for that is the obvious purpose of labor and anti-
trust law. However, the courts are incorrect in failing to at-
tempt creative solutions to a distinctive problem.
The NBPA (along with other professional sports unions),
is tremendously far removed from the common labor
union.237 The courts should admit this and thus attempt to
fashion creative solutions to the problems facing professional
basketball players. Because they have not, the players only
means of attaining complete freedom to earn their true mar-
ket value is via decertification.
The NFLPA briefly decertified in the early 1990s and
gained substantial concessions from the NFL as a result.238
For these reasons, professional basketball players should
have decertified during the summer of 1995 when they had
the opportunity. When the current CBA expires after the
2001 season the players should vote to decertify their union
in order to create true free agency and achieve their true
worth.
IV. ANALYSIS
Some people find it hard to sympathize with players
making millions of dollars who complain about where they
have to play. However, to understand the underlying ineq-
uity of the situation, suppose, instead of a basketball player,
that the victim of the restraint on freedom of choice in con-
nection with employment was a regular college student. Sup-
pose further that this college student was a lawyer in train-
234. See discussion supra Part II.
235. See discussion supra Part II.C.3-5.
236. See discussion supra Part II.C.3-5.
237. Corcoran, supra note 174, at 1056-59.
238. See discussion supra Part II.E.
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ing on the east coast and wanted to go to one of the top law
schools in the east in order to receive the finest possible edu-
cation and training so that he or she could become the best
lawyer possible. Upon graduating from law school, assume
that this same law student was told that he or she could not
negotiate with any law firm in the country. More precisely,
this student could not negotiate with law firms in the re-
gional area in which he or she wanted to practice and live,
but rather, his or her rights upon graduation were assigned
to the Dallas, Texas branch office of a large national law firm.
This was so because the last several years had been rather
unsuccessful for that office. Additionally, this graduating law
student could sign only for a pre-determined amount of
money.
Assume further that upon fulfilling this first contract,
and having proven himself or herself to be a successful attor-
ney, this lawyer could not offer his or her services to the high-
est bidder because every law firm had a ceiling on salaries,
that ceiling being a pre-determined amount relative to the
average income of American law firms. And finally, if this
lawyer wanted to go to a firm back east that was under this
limit, if his salary caused that firm to go over the predeter-
mined limit, that firm would have to pay a fixed amount into
a general pot which would be given to weaker and less well
run law firms. Of course this arrangement would defy logic
and common sense, but it is exactly this logic under which
basketball players enter the professional basketball market
and move within the market after they have entered into
their chosen profession. It is against this logic that this com-
ment is written.
Before the growth of professional sports and their un-
ions, salary abuse of players was generally quite common-
place.239 However, because of the incredible growth of inter-
est in professional basketball and its individual players and
the attention paid to these players (even in college and high
school) in today's society, combined with the strength and
239. Krasnow & Levy, supra note 1, at 756 n.22. "One sportswriter com-
mented: '[wihile big league players are remarkably well paid, it is equally re-
markable they aren't paid more.'" Coughlan, Baseball's Happy Serf The
Player, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 5, 1958, at 30. According to Judge Frank,
"if the players [are to] be regarded as quasi-peons, it is of no moment that they
are well paid; only the totalitarian-minded will believe that high pay excuses
virtual slavery." Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1949).
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prevalence of the role of agents (some would say too preva-
lent) in representing individual players,24 ° it is not realistic
that players will be abused by management as they had been
in the past. Therefore, union organization in the NBA is no
longer needed.
A. Successful Decertification by the NFL
Since the creation and growth of professional sports un-
ions, individual players have frequently litigated as re-
straints of trade numerous and varied provisions in the labor
agreements entered into between their unions and manage-
ment.241 For the players "the collective bargaining playing
field in professional sports has been littered with defeats."242
Since the landmark decision, the 1976 holding in Mackey
v. National Football League243 that upheld restraints on com-
petition within the market for players as falling within the
Sherman Act,2  players attempting to escape the restraints
of the provisions negotiated by their own unions have faced
an uphill and generally fruitless struggle. Making these ef-
forts increasingly more difficult was the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Powell 111.245 The Powell III decision further insu-
lated disputes between professional athletes and manage-
ment by creating the beyond impasse standard246 which up-
held various limitations on the rights of players to sign with
other teams in addition to extending the time period for
240. David L. Dunn, Regulation of Sports Agents: Since at First it Hasn't
Succeeded, Try Federal Legislation, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1040 (1988).
241. See, e.g., Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987)
(upholding draft and salary cap as protected by non-statutory antitrust exemp-
tion because terms were collectively bargained for); Mackey v. National Foot-
ball League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (claiming football team owners cannot
be sued for alleged antitrust violations arising out of collective-bargaining
agreement talks); Williams I, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding
draft and salary cap as protected by non-statutory antitrust exemption because
terms were collectively bargained for); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n,
389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (upholding player draft as not a violation of
antitrust laws).
242. Van Duch, supra note 6.
243. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
245. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
246. See discussion supra Part II.E.
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which these limitations could extend under a collective bar-
gaining agreement.247
The "littered with defeat" playing field in the NFL
changed after Powell III. After this ruling, the NFL decerti-
fled its union, plaintiffs in various suits were awarded treble
damages, and other plaintiffs were awarded total free
agency.248 At this point, NFL superstar Reggie White
brought a class action suit on behalf of himself and all other
players whose contracts were to expire as of February 1,
1993, asking for treble damages and free agency. 249 Fearing
another loss in the courtroom and unprecedented free agency
amongst its rank and file, the NFL came to the bargaining
table and a much more player-friendly collective bargaining
agreement was reached. 25 0 The players were able to negoti-
ate a much better CBA only after union decertification and
the courtroom victories by individuals who did not have to
hurdle over federal statutory labor exemptions previously en-
joyed by professional sports ownership. The NFL players
later decided that unionization was a better alternative than
complete decertification and a union free existence, so they
recertified the NFLPA.251 This recertification by the NFL
players was an appropriate move, for permanent decertifica-
tion of the NFL players union would have adverse effects
which NBA decertification would not.252
If the players of the NFL had not decertified their own
union, what kind of CBA would they have been forced to ac-
cept? How much profit would ownership be making on the
backs of the players, who are the product in professional
sports? How much of that profit would the players see? Cer-
tainly the players would not be able to approach the free
247. Powell III, 930 F.2d at 1302-03 (determining that after expiration of
agreement, the labor exemption extended indefinitely beyond any impasse be-
tween labor and management). "This decision effectively prohibited players
from bringing antitrust challenges to existing restraints and immunized other
unilaterally imposed restraints for an indefinite period of time. The result was
to dramatically increase the bargaining power of the owners." Corcoran, supra
note 174, at 1064.
248. See Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn.
1991) (awarding plaintiffs treble damages); see also Jackson v. National Foot-
ball League, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992) (awarding plaintiffs free agency).
249. See White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn.
1993).
250. Corcoran, supra note 174, at 1064.
251. Id. at 1063.
252. See discussion supra Part II.G.1.
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agency and compensation scale that they now enjoy. After
Powell III-but before decertification-the NFL knew it had
the upper hand in negotiating strength, and they were intent
on using it. 25
3
The clear picture, that evolves after more than five years
of legal wrangling with the league, is that the decertification
process works when professional athletes are seeking to es-
cape from restraints on their freedom.
B. Recent Challenges to NBA Collective Bargaining
Agreements
1. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n
The true legacy of the Robertson holding is the solidifica-
tion ofjudicial reluctance to dictate labor provisions in profes-
sional sports.254 Furthermore, the courts will do as much as
possible to keep the parties out of the court system and
within a collective bargaining arrangement.255 By merely ac-
cepting that these provisions are the result of collective bar-
gaining, past and current courts continue to avoid firm judi-
cial resolution of whether or not issues such as the draft,
salary cap and free agency restrictions are restraints of trade
and, thus, not allowed non-statutory protection. Instead
courts simply allow these issues to fail under the backdrop of
labor and antitrust exemptions.256
The 1976 CBA, emanating from the Robertson settle-
ment, was meant to create an eleven-year plan for handling
free agency.257 Unfortunately for the owners, player salaries
under this most recent CBA had by 1983 risen to an average
of more than $200,000 per year.258 Therefore, financial ruin
was predicted by the owners,259 who came up with the idea of
253. Corcoran, supra note 174, at 1063.
254. Jonathan C. Latimer, The NBA Salary Cap: Controlling Labor Costs
Through Collective Bargaining, 44 CATH. U. L. REV., 205, 227 n.153 (1994) (cit-
ing Scott J. Foraker, The National Basketball Association Salary Cap: An Anti-
trust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 168-69 (1985)).
255. See, e.g., Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1987); Williams I, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
256. See, e.g., Wood, 809 F.2d at 954; Williams I, 857 F. Supp. at 1069.
257. Schneider, supra note 103, at 828.
258. Id. at 830.
259. Id.
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the salary cap in order to, inter alia, to limit player
salaries.26 °
Without question, the league has prospered since its low
point in the early eighties. 261 And while the cap has certainly
helped ensure that teams do not lose money, whether or not
the cap itself has been the league-wide savior as some argue
is certainly debatable. Fortunately for NBA Commissioner
David Stern, professional basketball owners, and all other
advocates of salary caps, this cap was instituted at the same
time that three of the greatest basketball players of all time
were blossoming as talents and marketers of the game of pro-
fessional basketball: Larry Bird, Magic Johnson, and
Michael Jordan.262
More importantly, the salary cap is a clear cut labor re-
straint.263 Despite the fact that player salaries have skyrock-
eted over the past 12 years,264 the players own union has
been a hindrance to the players ability to achieve true market
value for their services. This has occurred because the pres-
ence of the union (and thus a collectively bargained for agree-
ment) allows courts to continue to uphold the non-statutory
labor exemption for professional basketball, and more di-
rectly, to acquiesce to restraints such as the salary cap and
the draft.
2. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n
When Leon Wood entered the 1984 NBA draft he had
highly marketable basketball skills as a former college All
American and Olympic gold medal winner.265 Unfortunately
for Wood, "[a]t the time of the draft, the 76ers' team payroll
exceeded the amount permitted under the salary cap. The
76ers therefore tendered to Wood a one-year $75,000 con-
tract, the amount stipulated under the salary cap."266 Hence,
260. Id.
261. Clifton Brown, There's No Stoppage in Sight, but the N.B.A. Is Very
Much in the Labor-Woes Lineup, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at B12.
262. Bird and Johnson entered the league in 1979 and Jordan was a rookie
in 1984.
263. Lanier v. National Basketball Ass'n, 82 Civ. 4935 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(quoted in Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D.
N.J. 1987).
264. See What's the Deal?, supra note 3. "The six year deal may allow aver-
age salaries to grow to as much as $3 million per year." Id.
265. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 956 (2d Cir. 1987).
266. Id. at 958.
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because of an agreement reached between the union that sup-
posedly represented his interests (the NBA players union,
like most unions, has the right to represent future players
267)
Wood was in the awkward position of being an individual
with highly marketable and highly desirable skills who,
nonetheless, could not market those skills to anyone other
than the team who had his draft rights. Moreover, the team
that had his draft rights was restricted from offering Wood
his true value because of the salary cap.268
Because the draft and salary cap were "embodied in a
collective agreement between the employer or employers and
a labor organization reached through procedures mandated
by federal labor legislation,"26 s the second circuit found that
there was "no reason to ignore federal legislation that explic-
itly prevent[ed] employees, whether in or out of a bargaining
unit, from seeking a better deal where the deal [was] incon-
sistent with the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment."270 All four of Wood's arguments for striking down the
draft and the salary cap were rejected by the court.271 These
arguments were that his superior abilities and high draft sta-
tus enabled him to bargain individually,272 that the draft and
salary cap "assign[ed] him to work for a particular employer
at a diminished wage,"273 that the provisions disadvantage[d]
new employees, 274 and finally "that the draft and salary cap
[were] illegal because they affect[ed] employees outside the
bargaining unit."275 Essentially these provisions were struck
down because Wood was arguing against national labor pol-
icy which upholds collective bargaining agreements.276
However, labor policy cannot be expected to have fore-
seen, nor be designed for, a situation where an employer self-
imposes a cap on how much it spends on worker salaries be-
cause management was paying them too much money, and
could not stop themselves! Although the courts' respect for
267. Id. "Indeed the National Labor Relations Act explicitly defines 'em-
ployee' in a way that includes workers outside the bargaining unit." Id. at 960.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 959.
270. Id. at 960.
271. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 960.
276. Id.
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the collective bargaining process itself is certainly warranted,
reliance on federal labor policy, in the context of the profes-
sional sports industry, is certainly misplaced considering how
dislike professional sports unions are from common labor
unions.
In disposing of Wood's second argument, that the draft
and salary cap "assign[ed] him to work for a particular em-
ployer at a diminished wage,"277 the second circuit relied on
the hiring hall mechanism in analogizing Wood's status and
defeating this argument. This reliance is wholly misplaced
and errant. Hiring halls are usually incorporated into labor-
management agreements in order to benefit both sides. 278 In
effect, both sides are saved the time and expense of job place-
ment by having the employee placed into a compatible posi-
tion with the employer via the hiring hall.279
This analogy fails for several reasons. First, in profes-
sional basketball the services of the players are so unique
that the athlete (usually via an agent) negotiates his wages
independently of the union.28 ° Second, the purpose of hiring
halls is to facilitate job placement, while the draft and salary
cap actually impose employment barriers by limiting who a
player can work for.28 ' And finally, the employee does not
have to work for whom the hiring hall places him, while the
first-round draftee is forced to negotiate only with the team
that drafted him.28 2
In rejecting Wood's third claim, that the draft and salary
cap disadvantage[d] him since he was a new employee, the
court once again narrow-mindedly relied on analogizing
Wood's status to that of the industrial worker.28 3 The court
made this analogy despite the fact that the two have nothing
in common absent the collective bargaining agreement. Be-
cause the court made no effort to differentiate the highly
skilled, basketball player and the generalized, standard wage
scale compensated industrial worker,28 4 the player's freedom
is restricted by labor policy developed for the protection of the
277. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
278. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
279. Daspin, supra note 209, at 113-14.
280. Id. at 115.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
284. Daspin, supra note 209, at 113-14.
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common worker, not the specialized professional basketball
player. This lack of vision and creativity by the court system
has left the players in the precarious situation of having to go
on strike and incur the wrath of the fans (not to mention the
loss of earnings in a career with a very short window of earn-
ing opportunity), or decertify their own union in order to es-
cape various restraints on their economic freedom of
opportunity.
Because of the agreement between the NBPA and the
NBA which included the salary cap and draft, Wood stood to
lose hundreds of thousands of dollars merely because the
76ers drafted him instead of any of the teams ahead of or be-
hind the 76ers in the draft.2" 5 Such an arbitrary system
seems to have no basis in a free market economy, especially
one in the purely entertainment based industry that is pro-
fessional basketball.
3. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n
Although the settlement of the Bridgeman lawsuit led to
a collective bargaining agreement, it represents yet another
loss for the players in their legal struggles with the NBA. De-
spite the fact that the business of the NBA was growing rap-
idly, 28 6 that teams were increasingly profitable in the middle
to late eighties,28 7 and that player support for the cap was
wavering,288 the union agreed to the continued imposition of
the draft and the salary cap as part of the settlement of the
Bridgeman suit.28 9 The union leadership was apparently
swayed by the management's "sky is falling" arguments that
without a cap protecting owners from themselves the league
would teeter on the precipice of disaster as it had in the early
eighties before the advent of the salary cap. The court, by
recognizing the validity of the collective bargaining agree-
ments after their expiration, cost the players a great deal of
bargaining leverage as to creating new terms. Undoubtedly
this factored heavily into negotiations for a new CBA.
285. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 958 (2nd Cir. 1987).
Eventually, after Philadelphia completed several roster maneuvers to free up
space for Wood, they signed him to a four-year $1.02 million dollar contract. Id.
286. Welling et al., supra note 108, at 72.
287. Id. "By 1986-87, all 23 (teams) should make money." Id.
288. Id.
289. See discussion supra Part II.C.4.
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4. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams
The players had demanded, during negotiations over a
CBA in 1994, that the restrictive draft and salary cap provi-
sions be eliminated.29 ° When the league refused, and later
sought an injunction to continue these practices absent an
agreement, the players and management were in court again
to determine the validity of restrictive provisions of a CBA.291
Once again, as seen in Wood and Bridgeman, the court held
that "antitrust immunity exists as long as a collective bar-
gaining relationship exists,"292 so the players freedom was
curtailed as long as their union existed.
The ramification of Williams is the stunning finality of
its ruling. Absent decertification, antitrust immunity will
protect NBA ownership from antitrust attack against restric-
tive provisions in the CBA negotiated by the NBA and the
NBPA. The loss that the players suffered in this case sig-
naled, once again, that the players would not get freedom
from the courts from any terms entered into by their union,
no matter how restrictive the terms happened to be. This rul-
ing, including the near urging of Judge Duffy that the players
decertify,"' paved the way for the unsuccessful, yet properly
conceived, decertification movement.
While law review articles will continue to be written at-
tacking the legality of these rulings, and players will continue
to sue their leagues seeking protection from these restraints,
the bottom line is that courts will not disturb CBAs (or even
the terms of expired CBAs) as long as the players are repre-
sented by unions. While this may be appropriate in the tradi-
tional labor-management environment, its precision in the
field of professional sports is questionable at best, improper
at worst. But the courts have proven that it will remain.
5. Current CBA
The league operated in 1994-95 without a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 294 And it was against this backdrop of a
league without a CBA that the decertification movement of
the summer of 1995 was led. This decertification movement
290. Welling et al., supra note 108, at 72.
291. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995).
292. Id.
293. See discussion supra Part II.D.
294. See Shappell, supra note 7.
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failed by a 226-134 vote,2 95 and a new six year deal between
the players union and management was immediately entered
into.296 But according to the attorney who led the decertifica-
tion movement, "'[t]he players will regret... (the new CBA),'
insisted [Jeffrey] Kessler, while predicting future challenges
to the NBA's 'way of doing things' on antitrust grounds."2 9 7
V. PROPOSAL
At the conclusion of the current six year deal, the players
of the NBA should decertify their union. The player draft,
the salary cap and other restrictions placed upon the players
are clearly labor restraints, protected only by the non-statu-
tory labor exemption of collective bargaining. The players
should test these claims in a court of law, absent such protec-
tion, and allow a jury to decide if these are restraints, much
as happened in Powell-McNeil.
When the players in the NFL decertified their union, the
NFLPA was still in existence, but it had been voluntarily rel-
egated to the status of a voluntary professional organiza-
tion.298 While decertified, the NFLPA contended that its role
was simply "to further the interests of active and former NFL
players using methods other than collective bargaining."
299
The membership of the NBPA could thus choose to deem its
former union as a voluntary professional organization. Alter-
natively, certain sub-groups of players could form their own
units for purposes of collective bargaining in order not to be
bound by the terms negotiated by the representatives of the
other players.300 This would be most realistic if all super-
stars broke into their own sub-group. Since the decertifica-
tion movement of the summer of 1995 was led mainly by
"superstars," this seems to be a realistic approach. Or sim-
ply, professional basketball could move forward wholly with-
out a union and the protections provided by it, and allow the
free market to determine the worth of the players.
295. See Van Duch, supra note 6.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn.
1991).
299. Id.
300. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 27, § 5.04 at 798.
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Management of professional sports leagues has always
held firmly to the argument that without the draft, various
types of salary caps, and other player restraints, large mar-
ket, big-wallet franchises would dominate the leagues.301
This would in turn drive smaller market, lesser financed
teams out of competition and, thus, out of the league. The
NBA's two-fold argument-that teams in small markets such
as Milwaukee and Salt Lake City should have live access to
one of the finest entertainment outlets in today's society, and
that the league itself is better for having teams in these mar-
kets-is inherently improper. However, if the NBPA makes
this argument because consolidation would mean less avail-
able jobs for its rank and file, the argument is more plausible.
The finest plays, symphonies, and art museums are his-
torically in large metropolises such as New York, Chicago,
Washington, D.C., San Francisco and Los Angeles. From a
pure business standpoint, the finest law firms are tradition-
ally based in large cities as well. From a pure entertainment
standpoint, Hollywood is where the vast majority of movies
are made, yet people throughout the country flock to the thea-
ters. For these reasons, it is not incorrect to assume that the
finest basketball teams should be in the larger cities, that the
people who are the best at what they do should be able to
perform in the largest markets where they can command the
top dollar possible (if they choose to work and live in these
large markets); and finally, the NBA, with its athletes evolv-
ing into entertainers, could still be enjoyed by citizens of
small markets who could enjoy watching Michael Jordan's
grace on the television screen, much as they can marvel at
their favorite stars of the big screen.
Assuming that the NBA is better off with teams in a wide
variety of national locales, the players would be better off
without a union that agrees to restrictive terms during the
collective bargaining process. The arguments advanced by
owners of professional sports teams throughout the years,
that the draft, assorted restrictions on player movement, and
the advent of salary caps are needed in order to maintain
competitive balance are fallacious, and the NBA would actu-
ally prosper without these restraints.
301. In re Dudley, 838 F. Supp. 172, 181 (D.N.J. 1993).
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Wealthier teams in large cities will not attract all the top
players. First, athletes want to perform. Unlike a successful
law firm, which can certainly find room year after year for the
best and the brightest to perform, a basketball team has only
a certain number of games in which to play, and only a cer-
tain number of minutes in which to play these games. No
player will sign with a team if it means diminished playing
time. °2 Second, athletes grow up in various locales and thus
have markedly different tastes. Certainly many would prefer
to earn a living in their hometown, be it in Los Angeles, At-
lanta or Portland.
Third, as seen for example, in baseball, the best run
teams, not those in the largest markets will succeed, even
with the relatively unfettered free agency seen in baseball.
In the 1995 baseball playoffs, Cincinnati faced Atlanta for the
National League Championship, while Cleveland and Seattle
did battle for the American League Championship. Mean-
while, such major market teams such as the New York Mets,
San Francisco Giants, and California Angels (southern Cali-
fornia), did not even make it to post-season play.
Furthermore, the draft has not worked to strengthen
weaker teams. The New Jersey Nets and Los Angeles Clip-
pers are prime examples of two teams that have had high
draft choices for several years, yet because of sheer inepti-
tude and mismanagement, they remain uncompetitive year
after year.30 3 These franchises should not be rewarded for
bad management with high draft choices. Nor should an ex-
tremely talented individual be forced into a franchise that is
poorly run on a consistent basis. These franchises should be
forced to be competitive or they should perish. While some
may point to the rise of the Orlando Magic in the NBA (the
Magic made it to the NBA finals in only their seventh year in
existence) as an example that the draft works as it should,
this is more an accurate reflection of a well run franchise that
has an eye for talented, emotionally stable individuals, that
develops its players well, makes the proper decisions as to
who should coach the team, and treats its players well
302. For example, Shaquille O'Neal, when he came out of college, most likely
would not have signed with the New York Knicks, for they already had all-star
Patrick Ewing playing the same position for them.
303. These two franchises are in the two largest metropolises, New York and
Los Angeles.
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enough to have a league-wide reputation solid enough that
high profile free agents are attracted to their franchise.
These less obvious, more intangible traits are what make a
professional basketball franchise competitive and profitable,
not the quick fix simplicity of the draft or restricted free
agency. Furthermore, if a team has performed poorly for sev-
eral years, it seems to make eminently more sense to give
that team the opportunity to sign several college stars if they
wish, rather than the one they are normally allowed to draft.
At the root of the inherent problems that athletes face in
dealing with stubborn ownership is that the players are in-
credibly well paid for participating in games that a great deal
of the population grew up participating in and enjoying.
While most do not deny that those who make it to the profes-
sional level of sports are supremely skilled at what they do
(and highly entertaining), society continues to be incredulous
at the stratospheric salaries paid to these individuals, even
as many pay increasingly escalating ticket prices, stay glued
to the television during numerous sporting events, and, to an
extent, live and die with the fortunes of favorite teams. Be-
cause these are "games" the salaries are seen as "out of line"
despite the fact that the average salary of NBA players (of
which there are approximately 350) roughly mirrors that of
the top 350 individuals in various other professions, such as
doctors, lawyers, and CEO's of major companies. Add to that
the fact that professional basketball players, like other pro-
fessional athletes, have a tiny window of opportunity in
which to earn their salaries, and the salaries are relatively
unremarkable.
Unfortunately, athletes cannot escape the current swell
of popular opinion that it is wrong for these individuals to
strike. For this reason, owners-who are vastly wealthier
than the players-are able to paint a picture of the players as
being out of touch for having the audacity to consider striking
despite their high remuneration; the general feeling during
the most recent baseball strike was outrage and incredulity
that the two sides could not agree on the best way to divide a
billion dollar pie. Therefore, the players tend to be backed
further against the wall than the owners when it comes to
public relations in regard to strikes and lockouts.
For these reasons, legal and otherwise, the best course of
action for the NBA players is to decertify their union upon
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the expiration of the most recently negotiated six-year CBA.
Upon decertification, the players will stand a realistic chance
in the courtroom to have the player draft, free agent restric-
tions, and the salary cap found to be illegal restraints of
trade. If decertification occurs, and these restrictions are
deemed illegal, then the owners will be forced to run their
teams well in order to compete in the marketplace. This will
lead to better management overall, better player develop-
ment, wiser talent decisions, and better and greater competi-
tion not only in the marketplace but on the court as well.
Those franchises that are not well run, and thus not success-
ful, will have to be either sold, moved, or folded. Certainly
there will be no shortage of potential buyers for these teams.
VI. CONCLUSION
The days of professional basketball players needing the
protection of a union are long past. When Krasnow and Levy
wrote their article on unionization 04 the players were in dire
need of just such protection. They currently need greater
freedom to earn their market value, and the only thing
preventing this freedom appears to be the very existence of
the union created to protect them. The NBPA has been very
successful in gaining numerous advantages for its players,
both in terms of respect from the owners and increased com-
pensation. It is clear that with the success of the NBA and
the popularity of its players, the players of the NBA do not
need the union for protection. The NBPA has run its course
and should be decertified, for the betterment of the players
and the product.
Eric R. McDonough
304. Krasnow & Levy, supra note 1.
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